The Anatomy of a Liberal Defeat (résumé). Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, May 2009, Carleton University, Ottawa.
Elisabeth Gidengil, Patrick Fournier, Joanna Everitt, Neil Nevitte and André Blais (2009)

This paper uses data from the 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2008 Canadian Election Studies to analyze the causes of the Liberal party’s historic defeat in the 2008 federal election. The analyses reveal the importance of long-term factors for understanding the change in the party’s electoral fortunes since 2000. The paper ends with a consideration of the implications for the Liberals’ future electoral prospects, as well the larger literature on voting behaviour in Canada.

Making Candidates Count: The Logic of Electoral Alliances in Two-Round Legislative Elections. The Journal of Politics 69 (1): 193-205.
André Blais and Indridi H. Indridason (2007)

Electoral systems have been shown to influence strategic voting and the development of party systems but the focus has rarely been on the strategies that parties adopt to take advantage of the electoral system under which they compete. Electoral pacts form one such strategy. We present a theory about the formation of electoral pacts in majority run-off elections and pay special attention to the consequences of the presence of extremist parties. Analyzing the 2002 French legislative elections we find that the Socialists and the Greens were more likely to form an alliance (and to agree on a common candidate) in closely contested constituencies and where there was a potential of coordination failure on the right. Finally, we show that the agreement primarily benefited the larger party.

One-round vs. Two-round Elections: An Experimental Study. French Politics 5: 278-286.
André Blais, Jean-François Laslier, Annie Laurent, Nicolas Sauger, and Karine Van der Straeten (2007)

The paper presents a series of experiments in which participants were invited to vote in four one-round elections and four two-round elections, with the same set of five candidates, among which three were viable and two were not. The experiments were designed to test the arguments put forward by Duverger and Cox about the propensity to vote sincerely or strategically in one-round and two-round elections. Our findings indicate little difference between the two systems. In both systems, there was a strong tendency to strategically desert the unviable candidates. The data thus support Cox over Duverger.

Electoral Systems and Turnout. Acta Politica 41: 180-196.
André Blais and Kees Aarts (2006)

Research dealing with contemporary western democracies has consistently shown that turnout is substantially higher under PR, under larger district magnitude, and under more proportional systems in general. That research has failed to explain, however, that how and why PR fosters turnout. Furthermore, the same pattern fails to be replicated in Latin America. Finally, studies that include a wide set of democracies find turnout to be higher under more proportional systems, but the reported impact is quite small. We conclude that the pattern observed in established democracies is not robust and that until we have developed a more compelling explanation for how and why PR fosters turnout, a sceptical position is justified.

Does Proportional Representation Foster Closer Congruence Between Citizens and Policy Makers? Comparative Political Studies 39 (10): 1243-1262.
André Blais and Marc André Bodet (2006)

This article assesses the claim that proportional representation (PR) fosters a closer correspondence between the views of citizens and the positions of the government. The study uses the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data set and compares respondents’ self-placements on a Left-Right scale with placements of cabinet parties’ locations in 31 election studies. The authors argue that PR has two contradictory consequences. On one hand, PR leads to more parties and more choice for voters; but these parties are less centrist, and this increases the overall distance between voters and parties. On the other hand, PR increases the likelihood of coalition governments; this pulls the government toward the center of the policy spectrum and reduces the distance between the government and voters. These two contradictory effects of PR wash out, and the net overall impact of PR on congruence is nil. The data support the authors’ interpretation.

Presidents, Political Context, and Economic Accountability: Evidence from Latin America (résumé). Political Research Quarterly 60 (3): 415-428.
François Gélineau (2007)

Using individual-level data collected in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, this article argues that electoral accountability revolves around the centralized nature of presidential regimes in the region and the relatively low level of institutionalization of party systems, which, under certain circumstances, constrain the ability of voters to hold the incumbent party responsible for past economic performance. In addition to probing the broader applicability of the economic voting models developed with reference to well-established democracies, the analysis contributes to improving our understanding of the interaction between institutional design and electoral behaviour.

Electoral Accountability in a Federal System: National and Provincial Economic Voting in Canada. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 35 (3): 407-424.
François Gélineau and Éric Bélanger (2005)

Are federal incumbents punished for national and/or provincial economic performance, and are provincial incumbents held accountable for the state of the provincial and/or national economy? Using a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of electoral results and macroeconomic data for 1953–2001, this article explores the extent to which provincial and federal incumbents in Canadian elections are affected more by national or provincial economic conditions. The results of the analysis suggest that federal incumbents would not gain many votes by claiming credit for the economic prosperity of any particular province when, on average, national economic conditions are deteriorating. The results further suggest that provincial incumbents are not held accountable for economic conditions in their provinces, but are rather punished for national economic deterioration when the incumbent federal party is of the same partisan family.

Political Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: The Argentine Experience, 1983-2001. British Journal of Political Science 36 (1): 133-157.
François Gélineau and Karen L. Remmer (2005)

To what extent does public support for subnational officials fluctuate in response to local rather than national performance? Are the policy failures of subnational officials reliably punished by voters? Drawing upon both individual and aggregate level data, this article attempts to shed new light on these questions about the politics of decentralization by exploring electoral outcomes and public opinion at the subnational level in Argentina. Consistent with referendum voting models, this analysis suggests that the fate of candidates in both national and subnational elections is shaped by the performance of the incumbent presidential administration. Moreover, to the extent that subnational performance has an electoral impact, voters do not necessarily respond in ways that enhance electoral accountability. Voters not only blame and reward subnational officials for national performance, but also attribute responsibility for subnational performance to national authorities. The implications with respect to the impact of decentralized decision making on democratic accountability are decidedly mixed and anything but consistent with the argument that decentralization results in a closer match between citizen preferences and the allocation of public resources.

Towards a Mixed-Member Proportional System for Québec? Representation 43 (4): 251-270.
Louis Massicotte (2007)

In December 2004, the Quebec provincial government tabled a proposal aimed at introducing a mixed-member proportional system (MMP) for elections to the National Assembly, broadly patterned on the German, New Zealand and Scottish electoral systems (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001). This article summarises the historical background of electoral system reform in Que´bec and the reasons for reform, analyses the proposal in detail, and explores the prospects for its ultimate adoption. The proposal can be found in a draft bill (Dupuis 2004), the contents of which were determined by the government on the basis of a working paper I prepared (Massicotte, 2004a).

The 2007 Provincial Election in Quebec. Canadian Political Science Review, 2 (1): 72-77.
Éric Bélanger (2008)

The 2007 provincial election in Quebec may be considered a milestone in recent Quebec politics. For the first time since 1878, voters elected a minority government in the province (Jean Charest’s Liberals), a third party (ADQ) replaced the Parti Québécois (PQ) as Official Opposition, and the PQ had its worst showing in 37 years. The pre-campaign was marked by the “reasonable accommodations” debate, which gave the ADQ the boost it needed to rival the two main parties. The incumbent Charest government suffered from its low popularity, due to what was largely perceived as a disappointing record. The PQ’s loss of support was mostly attributable to its new leader André Boisclair’s lack of appeal and to the party’s insistence on holding another referendum on Quebec sovereignty. Quebec’s new three-party system may last for some time, due to each party having strong and relatively well defined regional support bases.

A Political Economy Forecast for the 2005 British General Election. British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7 (2): 191-198. Éric Bélanger Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Richard Nadeau (2005)

Recently, we proposed an original statistical model for forecasting general elections in the United Kingdom, based on the observation of a few key indicators of the political and economic system. That vote function model was tested against the results of the 2001 general election. Here we evaluate the results of that test, and offer an appropriately revised model for the forecasting of the upcoming 2005 general election. According to our forecast, a Labour victory appears the most likely outcome.

Information, Visibility and Elections: Why Electoral Outcomes Differ when Voters are Better Informed (résumé). European Journal of Political Research 48: 256-280.
André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, Patrick Fournier and Neil Nevitte (2009)

This article assesses the aggregate effect of information shortfall on the outcome of the last six Canadian elections. Building on Bartels’ analysis, the authors find an information effect in three of the six elections examined, and in each case the information gap benefits the Liberal Party. That finding raises the question: why does information matter in some contexts but not in others? It is argued in this article that the information gap is related to lack of visibility. When and where all political parties have some degree of visibility, the less informed vote like the better informed, but when and where a party is hardly visible, the less informed are less likely to support that party. The less informed appear to consider a smaller set of options when they decide how to vote.

Back to the Future? Making Sense of the 2004 Canadian Election outside Quebec. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 39: 1-25.
Elisabeth Gidengil, André Blais, Joanna Everitt, Patrick Fournier, and Neil Nevitte (2006)

This paper uses data from the 2004 Canadian Election Study to analyze the factors that motivated a vote for each party and to identify the ones that mattered most to the outcome of the 2004 federal election outside Quebec. Particular attention is given to the impact of the sponsorship scandal, the sources of support for the new Conservative party and the factors that explain the NDP’s improved performance. The findings are used to address some basic questions about the 2004 election and its larger implications.

Forecasting the 2007 French Presidential Election: Ségolène Royal and the Iowa Model. French Politics 6 (2): 106-115.
Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Éric Bélanger, and Christine Fauvelle-Aymar (2008)

Scientific election forecasting has become a thriving enterprise in the leading democracies, and France is no exception. Among the first French efforts was the so-called ‘Iowa Model,’ a political economy equation predicting the winner on the basis of national economic performance and government popularity. The Iowa Model was applied to the 2007 French presidential contest, and did not fare as well as expected. We explore diagnostics on the Iowa Model, in an attempt to see what went wrong, meanwhile comparing it to rival forecasting efforts. It appears that an important omitted variable may be a direct measure of the quality of the campaign itself.

Judging Elections by their Outcome? Representation 41 (3): 180-188.
Louis Massicotte (2005)

This paper considers judgments based on electoral outcomes, questioning whether a decision on what is 'free and fair' can be related to what results from an electoral competition. It is noted that no one has seriously argued that elections should be deemed free and fair based on the extent to which a specific party has won, although it is possible that the electoral process may be more likely to be found acceptable when the 'ins' are defeated. Such a judgement would be a mistake. The thorny issue of socio-demographic and political party outcomes has produced no consensus, and it is important to remember that electorates remain free to produce outcomes with which we, in our wisdom, might disagree.

This paper investigates whether immigrants in Australia residing in situations of residential segregation (federal constituencies with high concentrations of immigrants) participate more in electoral politics than other immigrants. The results indicate that immigrants participate more when living in federal constituencies with high concentrations of immigrants and also exhibit greater homogeneity in their partisan preferences. The analysis also indicates that the impact of residential segregation is primarily observed among immigrants from non-English-speaking countries. Immigrants from visible minority background, such as those from South East Asia as well as those from Southern and South Eastern Europe, tend to be more strongly affected by the ethnic composition of their constituencies than other immigrants such as those from the United Kingdom and Ireland.

This paper considers judgments based on electoral outcomes, questioning whether a decision on what is 'free and fair' can be related to what results from an electoral competition. It is noted that no one has seriously argued that elections should be deemed free and fair based on the extent to which a specific party has won, although it is possible that the electoral process may be more likely to be found acceptable when the 'ins' are defeated. Such a judgement would be a mistake. The thorny issue of socio-demographic and political party outcomes has produced no consensus, and it is important to remember that electorates remain free to produce outcomes with which we, in our wisdom, might disagree.